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This paper attempts to identify implicit exchange-rate regimes for currencies of candidate countries vis-à-vis
the euro. To that end, we apply three sequential procedures that consider the dynamics of exchange rates to
data covering the period from 1999:01 to 2012:12. Our results would suggest that implicit bands have existed
in many sub-periods for almost all currencies under study. Once we detect de facto discrepancies between de
facto and de iure exchange-rate regimes, we make use of different methods to study the credibility of the
detected ﬂuctuation bands. The detected lack of credibility in a high percentage of the sample is robust to
the use of several credibility tests, suggesting that economic agents do not behave as if these bands
actually were in force at time of making their ﬁnancial plans. These countries do not improve the
conﬁdence on the ﬂuctuation bands as time evolves.
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1. Introduction
The Treaty on the European Union (EU) states that any European country may apply for member-
ship if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them.
The ﬁrst step is for the country to meet the key criterion for accession (the so-called ‘Copen-
hagen criteria’), being one of them is the ability to take on and implement effectively the obli-
gations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). Indeed, one of the economic priorities of the 1999 and 2000 Accession Partner-
ships was the establishment of an annual surveillance for the candidate countries, aimed at pre-
paring countries for the participation in the multilateral surveillance and economic policy co-
ordination procedures currently in place in the EU as part of the EMU. The Pre-Accession Econ-
omic Programmes are part of this procedure, outlining the medium-term policy framework,
including public ﬁnance objectives and structural reform priorities needed for EU accession, as
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well as offering an opportunity to develop the institutional and analytical capacity necessary to
participate in EMU, particularly in the areas of multilateral surveillance and co-ordination of
economic policies.
The current candidate countries (CCC) are Albania, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. All candidate countries except Albania and Mace-
donia have started accession negotiations, but the negotiations with Iceland were put on hold by
the Icelandic government in May 2013.
Unlike Denmark, Sweden, or the UK, the adoption of the euro is not an option for the CCC of
the EU, but an obligation. However, the CCC and the New Member States (NMS) can make
decisions regarding the timing of this process. Joining EMU involves the loss of control over
the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate. At the same time, these countries will
have to abide by the discipline imposed by the Maastricht convergence criteria (price stability,
the duration of convergence, obtaining sound, and sustainable public ﬁnances and exchange-
rate stability) and the Stability and Growth Pact.
The choice of exchange-rate policy becomes one of the most fundamental instruments for
achieving macroeconomic stability, offering competitiveness and affecting the overall develop-
ment of the economy. Prior to EU membership, CCC are free to adopt the exchange-rate
regime of their choice and they can enter the EU with their prevailing exchange-rate regime.
Since the assessment of exchange-rate stability includes as mandatory the participation for at
least 2 years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) linking the currencies of non-euro
area, most of the CCC are expected to join it at some point after their accession to the EU.
Participation in ERM II could help CCC in stabilizing the exchange rate by anchoring the
expectations and encouraging low and less volatile inﬂation, leading to lower risk premium
and interest rates, as well as lower transaction costs. Additionally, participation in ERM II
would invoke effective pressure for responsible macroeconomic policies and for consolidation
and reforming of public ﬁnance above all, giving that any form of ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes
strictly requires consistent and sound macroeconomic policies. However, there are some potential
problems associated with CCC participation in ERM-II. With limited exchange-rate ﬂexibility
and an environment of increasing capital mobility, the large capital inﬂows that will be directed
towards these economies (mainly in the form of foreign direct investment) are expected to exert
appreciating pressures on domestic currencies. Moreover, their ﬁnancial systems are not fully
developed posing problems in the transmission of the monetary policy. Finally, some credibility
problems may arise from the fact that central parities are subject to realignment: in the case of
CCC involved in a catching-up process the credibility of the central rate may be eroded over time.
These and other potential gains and shortcomings could have not gone unnoticed for some of
the CCC and could have signiﬁcantly affected their decision to participate de facto, but not de iure
in the ERM II, establishing implicit bands andmaintaining the exchange rate around a central parity
while permitting enough ﬂexibility to adjust to fundamental disequilibrium and allowing some
degree of monetary policy discretion.1 Indeed, the de facto exchange-rate policy adopted by mon-
etary authorities has tended to differ from the announced de iure exchange-rate regime, which is
why International Monetary Fund (IMF) classiﬁcations are not always a good guide to the true
exchange-rate intentions of said authorities (see, for example, Bubula & Ötker-Robe, 2002;
Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger, 2005; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004 among others).
This paper contributes to the existing economic literature by investigating the existence of
implicit ﬂuctuation bands in ﬁve of CCC (Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey)2 and by assessing their credibility. To that end, we ﬁrst make use of
three sequential procedures based on the exchange-rate behaviour during the period 1999–2012 to
detect implicit bands, and we then apply several credibility measures to evaluate the perception of
economic agents with respect to the commitment to maintain such implicit bands.
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Most studies in the literature investigate exchange-rate regimes in emerging countries
(Ferrari-Filho & De Paula, 2008; Piragic & Jameson, 2005 to name a few), very few explore
them in NMS (see, e. g., Åslund, 2011; Bauer & Herz, 2005; Darvas, 2001; Josiﬁdis, Allegret,
& Pucar, 2013), but to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous research that empirically
evaluate this issue for CCC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the statistical procedures
based on the evolution of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro used to detect implicit ﬂuctuation
bands and we examine in detail three instruments as different measures of robustness to
determine the credibility of the identiﬁed ﬂuctuation bands. In Section 3, we offer the empirical
results identifying the de facto ﬂuctuation bands and the sub-periods characterized by the absence
of credibility in the exchange-rate system country by country for the ﬁve countries mentioned
above, covering the period 1999–2012. Finally, in Section 4 some concluding remarks are
provided.
2. Methodology
2.1. Implicit ﬂuctuation bands
The ERM II was established in 1999 as a framework to manage the exchange rates between EU
currencies and ensure stability. It is a regime of ﬁxed exchange rates in which participating cur-
rencies can only ﬂuctuate by a maximum of ±15% around the central euro rate, although tighter
ﬂuctuation bands can also be agreed. Indeed, the currencies participating in ERM II have
remained broadly stable against the euro, trading at, or close to, their respective central rates,
suggesting that narrower bands have been effectively implemented. As surveyed in Stockman
(1999), proponents of narrow band target zones suggest them as substitutes of a monetary com-
mitment. Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) argued that exchange arrangements like the predecessor of
ERM II contributed to import credibility for domestic monetary policies, because differential
inﬂation translates into real exchange-rate appreciation, reducing the policy-maker’s incentive
to inﬂate. Therefore, we explore the possibility of the existence of implicit ﬂuctuations bands
of ±1 or ±2.
Moreover, we also allow the occurrence of crawling bands, where the currency is maintained
within certain ﬂuctuation margins around a central rate and the central rate or margins are adjusted
periodically at a ﬁxed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators. This
regime allows the monetary authorities to achieve a balance between the disinﬂation policy pro-
vided by a peg and the preservation of competitiveness. The desired balance between these two
targets is obtained by adjusting the size of the preannounced devaluation of the reference rate.
Both Hungary and Poland adopted this regime during most of the 1990s: Hungary followed a
narrow band crawling peg and Poland adopted a wide band crawling peg (see, e.g. Coudert &
Couharde, 2012; Szapáry, 2001). Campos and Torres (2007) and Rodríguez and Rodríguez
(2003) contend that an exchange-rate crawling-band system can borrow a portion of those
aspects of a target zone that lead to its stabilizing effects on the exchange rate. The main advan-
tages are to avoid economic instability as a result of infrequent and discrete adjustments and to
minimize the rate of uncertainty and volatility since the ﬂuctuation in the exchange rate is kept
minimal (Kane, 1988).3
In this section we will explain in detail the three procedures based on the dynamics of the
exchange rate for the detection of implicit ﬂuctuation bands. First, the descriptive procedure
used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is based on the monthly percentage variation of the absolute
value of exchange rate. This method is based on the probabilities that this variation is maintained
within a certain band, it can be ±1%, ±2%, or ±5%, for two or ﬁve rolling years. According to this
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criterion, if the probability exceeds or equals 80%, we will conclude the existence of a de facto
ﬁxed monetary system during the time in which that percentage stays.
Nevertheless, one of the main limitations of this method, according to Ledesma-Rodríguez,
Navarro-Ibáñez, Pérez-Rodríguez, and Sosvilla-Rivero (2005a), is the absence of a statistical sig-
niﬁcance contrast to corroborate the achieved results. To rectify this weakness, they propose a
contrast in which the null hypothesis (H0) says that the probability that the monthly exchange-
rate percentage variation is maintained a band of ±1% or ±2% for 24 consecutive months (includ-
ing the current one) is less or equal than the same threshold established by the above procedure
(0.8).
One of the necessary requirements to apply this procedure is to ensure ﬁrst normality and the
absence of serial correlation of the series to analyse. For this reason, we take advantage of the
Jarque–Bera, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, and the test of von-Neumann. Having conﬁrmed
these two properties we are able to continue with the statistical test, which formally can be
expressed in the following way:
H0 : p ≤ p0,
H1 : p . p0,
where p represents the proportion of the population and p0 is the established probability or
threshold. Therefore, this contrast serves to determine if the population proportion is less or
equal than a frequency p0, accepting the absence of bands. According to these authors, the
region’s acceptance of the null hypothesis happens when pˆ ≤ 1, pˆ being the estimated sample
proportion and 1 = p0 + z1−a NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMep0q0√ / NameMeNameMen√ , where z1−a is the critical value of standard normal
distribution at conﬁdence level of 1−α. On the other hand, NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMep0q0√ / NameMeNameMen√ indicates the population
deviation, q0 = 1− p0 , and n is the sample size.
Another variant that also allows us to ﬁlter results by their statistical signiﬁcance for the
identiﬁcation of the implicit ﬂuctuation bands is proposed by Ledesma-Rodríguez, Navarro-
Ibáñez, Pérez-Rodríguez, and Sosvilla-Rivero (2005b). Unlike the previous method, this
approach does not offer a contrast on the probabilities, but directly on the monthly exchange-
rate percentage variations. Based on the normality and independence assumptions, to test if the
average of such variations is signiﬁcantly less or equal than ±1% or ±2% over a period of 24 con-
secutive months:
H0 : m ≤ m0,
H1 : m . m0,
where m represents the population mean of these variations and m0 is the given mean (±1% or
±2%). In this contrast, the acceptance region happens when x ≤ 1, x being the sample mean and
1 = m0 + t1−aS/
NameMeNameMe
n
√
where t1−a is the critical value of the t-Student distribution at a conﬁdence
level of 1− a, S is the quasi-variance and n is the sample size.
2.2. Credibility test of ﬂuctuation bands
The entrance to the ERM II for many countries means an increase in the level of credibility about
the monetary and exchange commitments made by monetary authorities, especially for those who
have experienced inﬂationary periods, since it allows them to act as a real anchor on exchange-
rate policy. Credibility becomes a key issue in examining the behaviour of a target zone agreement
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such as the ERM II, since the possibility that the ofﬁcial authorities change the central parity could
be anticipated by the economic agents, triggering expectations of future changes in the exchange
rate that could act as a destabilizing element of the system. In this context, credibility refers to the
perception of economic agents with respect to the commitment to maintain the exchange rate
around a central parity. For this reason, in this section we present three alternative indicators as
measures of credibility that have been widely used in the empirical literature.
2.2.1. Svensson simple test
The simple and robust Svensson (1991)’s method is an indicator that is commonly used to verify
the credibility of the exchange-rate regime of a target zone exchange-rate regime with ﬂuctuation
bands. A target zone delimits explicitly what are the bands of appreciation and depreciation of the
exchange rate.
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility (which is the lack of opportunities for arbit-
rage between different currencies), the annualized rate of return in terms of the domestic currency,
ex post, associated with the purchase of a ﬁnancial asset at time t in foreign currency with a matur-
ity period τ can be obtained from the following expression:
Rtt = (1+ i∗tt )
St+t
St
( )12/t
− 1,
where the maturity period of the asset (τ) is measured in months. According to Svensson (1991), if
an investor invests a national currency unit that is equivalent to say investing 1/St units of foreign
currency, which means that, after the maturity period, the investor acquires a yield of
(1+ i∗tt )t/12/St units of foreign currency. Once again, to express this performance in units of
national currency it must be multiplied by the exchange rate (St+t) which is being equal to
(1+ Rtt )t/12.
By deﬁnition in a context of a target zone is expected that the exchange rate is between
minimum (S) and maximum (S) limits. As the τ-month ahead exchange rate is uncertain at time
t, the previous limits in the national currency appreciation and depreciation involve a delimitation
of the rate of return, which is to be found between the lower limit (Rtt ) and the upper limit (R
t
t ):
Rtt = (1+ i∗tt )
S
St
( )12/t
− 1 ; Rtt = (1+ i∗tt )
S
St
( )12/t
− 1.
It is necessary to clarify that even if the national interest rate is within these bands it cannot be
guaranteed with ﬁrmness that the target zone is credible. On the other hand, if the domestic inter-
est rate falls signiﬁcantly outside of the return bands, we are able to conﬁrm that this exchange-
rate system during the period under study is not credible.
2.2.2. Drift adjustment test
Svensson (1991)’s test has been criticized because it cares only about the possibility of a realign-
ment (change in the established central parity level) when the exchange rate is close to the ﬂuc-
tuation band limits. For this reason, we have selected another alternative procedure, known as the
method of Drift adjustment (DA). This method, originally proposed by Bertola and Svensson
(1993), consists of estimating, through a linear regression model, the realignment expectations
of economic agents conditioned to have experienced one of these events before. This indicator,
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reverse of the measure of credibility, is obtained by taking the uncovered interest parity hypoth-
esis, decomposing the exchange rate into two components (central parity and exchange rate
within the band) and taking into account that
Et[Dxt+t] = (1− ptt )Et
Dxt+t
nr
[ ]
+ ptt Et
Dxt+t
r
[ ]
,
where ptt is the probability determined at time t of experiencing a realignment during the period
between t and t + τ. The right side of the expression indicates if the expectation is conditioned to
having submitted a realignment (r) or not having it experienced (nr). Moreover, taking into
account the deﬁnition of devaluation, the following expression contains in its ﬁrst term on the
right side the expected realignment and in the second one its own expected depreciation within
the band:
gtt =
Et[Dct+t]
t
+ p
t
t
t
Et
xt+t
r
[ ]
− Et xt+tnr
[ ]{ }
.
Finally, we obtain that
gtt = it − i∗t −
Et[Dx t+t/nr]
t
.
To obtain the expected devaluation we proceed in the following way: ﬁrst, we estimate the
expected depreciation within the band conditioned on not having suffered any realignment
(last term in the right side of this equation) and subsequently applying the interest rate differential
we achieve gtt . Instead of working with the point estimation, we calculate conﬁdence intervals
with a 0.10 signiﬁcance level for our interest variable.
In order to estimate the expected depreciation within the band according to the DA method,
we use the linear regression model proposed by Svensson (1993) in which the explanatory vari-
ables to consider are the logarithm of the distance of the exchange rate with respect to the central
parity (x t ) and 3 months interbank interest rates, both national and Euro Zone (it and i∗t , respect-
ively):
xt+t − xt
t
=
∑
j
ajdj + b1xt + b2it + b3i∗t + et+t.
The dummy variables dj take value one during the sub-period between realignments and ﬂuc-
tuation bands enlargement.4
Since the expected depreciation with the band needs to be predicted taking into account that it
is conditioned on not having experienced any episode of realignment, Svensson (1993) removes
the observations associated with the 3 months preceding the realignments occurred. However, to
avoid reducing the number of observations signiﬁcantly, we follow the Ledesma-Rodríguez,
Navarro-Ibáñez, Pérez-Rodríguez, and Sosvilla-Rivero (2000) and Ledesma-Rodríguez et al.
(2005a)’s procedure, the estimation is based on the whole sample. This means that, instead of
obtaining the expected devaluation gtt , we get the expected realignment.
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2.2.3. Discrete choice models
Since our interest is to be able to calculate the probability of realignment for these ﬁve countries,
we consider non-linear probabilistic models that allow reliable estimates for the dichotomous
variables. The most common models focus on the function of logistic and standard normal distri-
bution, known as Logit and Probit models, respectively. This paper presents the results related to
the Logit model, since the Logit and Probit estimated coefﬁcients are very similar5 (see, e.g.
Ameniya, 1981, in which it is stated that: bˆLOGIT = 1.6∗bˆPROBIT).
Our dependent variable will be built based on the results obtained by the DA method in order
to get estimated probabilities’ time series. In particular, when both conﬁdence interval limits of
the expected depreciation within the band are greater or less than zero, we say that there is no
credibility, assigning value 0 to the interest variable ( yt = 0 ) and when this condition is not ful-
ﬁlled the dependent variable takes value 1 (yt = 1 ), indicating credibility in the exchange system.
The probability that agents assign the value 1 in a given moment can be calculated from the fol-
lowing expression:
P(yt = 1) = L(z′ˆt b) =
ez
′ˆ
t b
1+ ez′ˆt b ,
where z′ˆt b = b1 + b2z1t , L (.) is the cumulative logistic distribution function, z1t is the expla-
natory variable (this model considers the exchange rate, the distance from the central parity, the
distance from the upper limit of the band, and the interest rates differential) and P(yt = 0) is the
probability of realignment.
3. Empirical results
In this section we proceed with the detection of de facto ﬂuctuation bands of the exchange rates
for the ﬁve countries during the period 1999:01–2012:12 using the three sequential procedures. In
addition, we analyse, country by country, the results of the three credibility indicators as a
measure of robustness, making a comparison between them, trying to ﬁgure out which one is
the most accurate in identifying stages of credibility crisis. The monthly exchange rates are
spot rates expressed as domestic monetary units per euro and have been downloaded from the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Eurostat websites. Figure 1 (Panels A–E) reﬂects the evol-
ution of the ﬁve countries exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro, besides their central parities and their
ﬂuctuation bands. We exhibit the main conclusions about the implicit ﬂuctuation bands, country-
by-country, relying on Table 1.6
Croatia: The behaviour of the Croatian kuna/euro exchange rate (HRK/EUR) shows patterns
consistent with a de facto ﬁxed exchange-rate regime that is endorsed by our detection criteria,
although in a different degree. The contrast directly on average variations proposed by
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005b) concluded the presence of ±2% and ±1% ﬂuctuation bands
in 100% of the sample, selecting the latter for being the narrowest. In the same line Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004)’s method is positioned, who also identiﬁed that bands of ±2% throughout
the period reduced this percentage to 74.85% of the sample after proceeding to its relevant stat-
istical contrast (1999:01–2001:07 and 2003:04–2012:12). Analysing potential ±1% bands, the
percentage is still quite signiﬁcant, we are talking that the ﬁrst procedure detects a 61.40%
(1999:01–2001:07 and 2005:03–2012:12), keeping a 37.43% (2001:2001–01:03, 2006:04–
2008:11, 2010:11–2012:12) in the second.
From Figure 1 (Panel A) can be seen two sharp declines in the exchange-rate HRK/EUR; the
ﬁrst, in July 2001 and the second episode is associated with the global ﬁnancial crisis, which
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eventually lead to the appreciation of the local currency in September and November 2008.
Based on the Svensson (1991)’s test, both events have coincided with a lack of credibility in
the ﬂuctuation band by economic agents (Figure A1, Panel A in the Appendix). This ﬁgure
shows high volatility in the credibility throughout the whole period identifying stages in
which the evolution of the interest rate is above the return band and stages in which the opposite
happens.
Figure 1. Evolution of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro, their central parities and their ﬂuctuation
bands. Panel A: Croatian kuna; Panel B: Icelandic krona; Panel C: Denar (of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia); Panel D: Serbian dinar; and Panel E: Turkish lira.
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In addition to the phase associated with not much credibility after the realignment occurred in
2004:05, that the DA method detects from 2004:10 to 2005:02, other previous stages are ident-
iﬁed (1999:12–2000:04, 2001: 07, and 2004:01) and subsequent phases coinciding with the ﬁnan-
cial crisis (2009:02–2009:03). The last criterion using all the explanatory variables reinforces the
previously identiﬁed stages: 1999–2001, along with the stage at the end of 2008 and at the begin-
ning of 2009.
Iceland: Beginning our analysis for the checking of the existence of ±2% ﬂuctuation band in
the exchange-rate Icelandic krona/euro (ISK/EUR), the last procedure is capable of specifying the
following sub-periods 1999:01–2008:03, 2008:05, 2008:07–2008:08, 2008:10–2008:12, and
2010:10–2012:12 as those in which the exchange rate does not experiment deviations with
respect to the above-mentioned bands. This 72.51% that it represents on the whole sample
period moves away enough of the contributed ones for the remaining methods. The ﬁrst one
just determines a 14.04% (1999:01, 2003:12–2005:05, 2011:05–2011:08, and 2012:01),
whereas the second one accepts the hypothesis of the absence of bands during the whole
period. We do not also ﬁnd any evidence of which the probability of these percentage absolute
monthly variations of the exchange-rate ISK/EUR is under ±1% ﬂuctuation bands in any sub-
period, result that it reiterated after having been ﬁltered through its statistical signiﬁcance.
Table 1. Detection of ±1% or ±2% implicit ﬂuctuation bands country-by-country using Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004), Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005a), and Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005b)’s procedures.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al.
(2005a)
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al.
(2005b)
±1% ±2% ±1% ±2% ±1% ±2%
Croatia
1999:01–
2001:08
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2001:03
1999:01–
2001:07
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2012:12
2005:03–
2012:12
2006:04–
2008:11
2003:04–
2012:12
2010:11–
2012:12
Iceland
– 1999:01–
2000:12
– – 2003:10–
2005:09
1999:01–
2008:12
2003:12–
2005:05
2010:10–
2012:12
2011:05–
2011:08
2012:01
Macedonia
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2012:12
1999:01–
2012:12
Serbia
– 1999:01–
2007:12
– 1999:01–
2006:06
1999:01–
2008:10
1999:01–
2012:12
2010:07–
2011:12
2010:12–
2011:04
2010:04–
2012:02
Turkey
– – – – – 2004:06–
2008:10
2010:02–
2012:12
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On the other hand, and taking into account that the critical region is above the average of percen-
tage variations, this means the acceptance of the presence of minor or equal to ±1% bands for the
following sub-periods: 2000:12, 2001:02–2001:03, 2003:10–2005:09, 2008:10–2008:11,
2012:01–2012:02, and 2012:04–2012:07 which represent a 20.47% of the sample.
The sharp depreciation of the exchange rate at the end of 2008 which can be perceived as quite
remarkable from Figure 1 (Panel B) is due to the ﬁnancial crisis that took place in this economy.
Even though the interest rate is within the return bands during only 3 months, this fact does not
guarantee, according to Svensson (1991) a period of credibility on the ﬂuctuation bands.
However, we can afﬁrm that from October 2008 onwards there is evidence of a lack of credibility
by the economic agents. In addition, the exchange-rate ISK/EUR also shows evidence of devi-
ations from the minimum limit, both 2000:03–2000:05, 2005:10–2006:03, and 2010:08–
2010:12, this situation is a consequence of the high lack of credibility associated with the ﬂuctu-
ation bands (see Figure A1, Panel B in Appendix). This argument is also applicable to stages in
which the exchange rate has experienced deviations from the upper limits of the ﬂuctuation bands
(2009:08–2010:01).
The absence of credibility detected in 2001:03 by the DA mechanism (Figure A2, Panel B in
Appendix) conﬁrms the ability by the economic agents to anticipate correctly that the later (in
2001:04) would lead to a realignment of the exchange rate. This situation is reiterated in the
third and fourth realignment, which takes place as a result of the economic crisis and the difﬁcul-
ties to reﬁnance its short-term debt, leading to the collapse of three major commercial banks in its
country.
Unlike prior procedures, in which a larger number of conﬁdence crisis are detected, the binary
choice method only identiﬁes, by unanimity, the stage at the end of 2008, and at the beginning of
2009 (see Panel B in Figures A3 and A4 in Appendix).
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: In spite of the fact that Macedonia is a candidate
country to became part of EU, the exchange-rate Denar (of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia)/euro (MKD/EUR) presents a standard behaviour typical enough of an exchange
system distinguished by the stability, which would suppose an impulse on trade and investment.7
This statement has its base in the achieved results across the three sequential procedures that con-
sider the exchange rate’s dynamic. All of them support the existence of ±1% ﬂuctuation bands and
of ±2% throughout the whole period.
Although the exchange rate remains stable without deviating at any time from its ﬂuctuation
bands (Figure 1, Panel C), both the Svensson test and DA method conﬁrm the lack of conﬁdence
in the exchange rate during this period. In Figure A1 (Panel C) the proﬁtability associated with
borrowing in foreign market to ﬁnally lend on the national one stays signiﬁcantly away from
the return bands. On the other hand, the expectation of depreciation within the band for this can-
didate country holds throughout the whole period, since both conﬁdence interval limits are greater
than zero (see Figure A2, Panel C in Appendix).
Serbia: The disparity between previous methods becomes evident for the Serbian dinar/euro
exchange rate (RSD/EUR). If we focus on the potential band of ±1%, Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004) and Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005a)’s methods suggest the lack of ±1% bands. In con-
trast, the last criterion proposes the following sub-periods: 2010:04–2012:02 and 2012:05 as
those in those where the average of percentage variations does not deviate from a ±1% band
or from a narrower band (representing 60.74% of the sample). Major conformity seems to
exist when ±2% ﬂuctuation band is considered, though not so much in magnitude. The ﬁrst
mechanism is capable of detecting a 49.63% (1999:01–2007:12 and 2010:07–2011:12), the
second one diminishes its percentage up to 26.67% (1999:01–2006:06 and 2010:12–
2011:04), whereas the last one recognizes the totality of sample (in this case given the available
information: 2002:01–2012:12).
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Examining the behaviour of the Serbian dinar vis-à-vis the EUR, it can conﬁrm how barely
trading around the central parity in fact is often close to the upper and lower ﬂuctuation bands
(Figure 1, Panel D).
At the beginning of the period, the lack of credibility was clearly signiﬁcant, but in spite of
this scenario, a gradually reduction to its minimum in 2007:08 is achieved (Figure A1, Panel
D in Appendix). From this date, since the return bands delimit the evolution of the exchange
rate, the absence of credibility disappears, increasing again in 2009:01, a time when the interest
rate stands at 18.61%. Given the availability of data from the interbank rate for this economy, we
are unable to conﬁrm whether the positive deviation from the upper limit of the ﬂuctuation band
has been due to the lack of credibility of the agents to these bands.
According to the DA procedure (Figure A2, Panel D in Appendix), the expected depreciation
within the band becomes more important in 2004:02–2005:11, just at the moment in which rea-
lignments occur (2006:07 and 2008:10) and, like the Svensson test, from January to May 2009
and again in July 2010.
Figure A3 (Panel C) in Appendix shows a clear trend of increase in the probability of realign-
ment as time evolves, presenting values around 0.61 in the two realignments upcoming dates.
Around more than 50% is the probability for the ﬁrst realignment when we analyse the distance
from the central parity as an explanatory variable, a completely opposite situation for the second
realignment, where barely reach 10% (Figure A4, Panel C in Appendix). Considering the distance
from the upper limit of the ﬂuctuation band,8 we also identify a high volatility in the estimated
probability of the exchange system collapse since at least this probability is around 30% at any
time during the whole period.
Turkey: We do not ﬁnd evidence that allows us to conﬁrm the presence of ±1% not of ±2%
implicit ﬂuctuation bands for the Turkish lira/euro exchange rate (TRY/EUR) using the ﬁrst
two approaches. On the one hand, if we analyse Table 1, we can verify that the proportion of
monthly TRY/EUR exchange-rate variation does not exceed threshold nor the critical region,
respectively. On the other hand, the last procedure does not identify the presence of narrow
bands of ±1%. Nevertheless, it is capable of detecting the following substages (2004:06–
2008:10 and 2010:02–2012:12), in which the exchange rate does not turn aside ±2% bands repre-
senting 52.38% of the sample.
This other candidate country for EU membership does not present a clear trend of currency
depreciation or appreciation; nevertheless, it identiﬁes signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations during the 13
years examined (Figure 1, Panel E). As a consequence of speculative attacks, it has generated
an uncertain environment supported by the three methods used as tools for robustness. First,
the Svensson test shows no credibility from the beginning to the end of the period analysed,
although it shows a downward trend, reducing signiﬁcantly from mid-2005 (Figure A1, Panel
E in Appendix). The DA method also offers a multitude of accurate dates for which the expected
depreciation within the ﬂuctuation band acquires more importance; among them, at the end of
1999, during 2001 and 2002 (coinciding with the realignment of 2001:03 and 2002:07) and sub-
sequently to the extension of bands in 2004:05–2004:11, 2006:06, and 2011:08.
Finally, the discrete choice method shows an average probability of the expected realignment over
than 20%. With the exception of Panel D of Figure A3 in Appendix, where an increase in agents’
conﬁdence is detected as we move away along the time horizon, the Panel D of Figure A4 in Appen-
dix shows short periods but high distrust in the exchange rate over the whole sample period.
4. Conclusions
Having applied three sequential procedures based on the evolution of the exchange rate vis-à-vis
the euro on ﬁve candidates countries to join the EU, our results suggest the presence of ±2% and
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±1% implicit ﬂuctuation band in high percentages of the sample period. These percentages vary
depending on the methodology used, even reach 100% in countries such as Croatia, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia. Therefore, this paper provides new empirical evi-
dence that strengthens the hypothesis that the implemented policies differ from those announced
by the monetary authorities, identifying the existence of de facto ﬁxed monetary systems along a
large number of sub-periods for different currencies. In other words, it has been detected that
many of these countries act as if they were already de facto (but not de iure) in the ERM-II,
showing an evolution of their currencies consistent with the existence of ﬂuctuation bands vis-
à-vis the euro.
Nevertheless, the simple Svensson test, the DA method, and discrete choice models indicate
lack of credibility for a high percentage of the sample in which the evolution of the exchange rate
exceeds the detected minimum and/or maximum ﬂuctuation bands’ limits, suggesting that econ-
omic agents do not behave as if these bands actually were in force at the time of making their
ﬁnancial plans. Furthermore, these countries do not show signs of improvement in the conﬁdence
on the ﬂuctuation bands as time evolves. In fact, in countries such as Croatia, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey an important volatility in the credibility throughout the
period analysed can be observed, a conclusion that is reinforced by the implementation of the
three different methods. The other candidate countries reveal extended stages of absence of credi-
bility accompanied by an upward trend in the probability of realignment.
It should be emphasized that the three alternative procedures have been able to capture accu-
rately those stages of absence of credibility prior to those realignments that really occurred sub-
sequently. In some cases, the three methods coincide identifying the sub-periods of lack of
credibility, while in others they complement each other improving the results. On the other
hand, the ﬁgures associated with the simple Svensson test reveal us a pattern of behaviour that
can be seen in most of the analysed currencies: the domestic interest rate deviates quite often
above the upper limit of the return band indicating the ease of borrowing abroad to subsequently
lend in the domestic market.
Thus, it seems that the results offer a wide variety of strategies in the countries under study when
they link de facto to the ERM-II to try on the one hand to capture the beneﬁts of their participation
(helping actively to stabilize their economies – especially on prices and consolidation of public
accounts – and the increase in the governments reputation), moderating somewhat the potential pro-
blems arising from formal participation (de iure) in the ERM-II (primarily the possibility of currency
appreciation episodes due to capital inﬂows, especially by foreign direct investment).
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Notes
1. For example, the latest Flash Eurobarometer issued by the European Commission (‘Introduction of the
euro in the Member States that have not yet adopted the common currency’) indicates that over half of
the respondents think that the impact of euro has been positive in the countries that have already
adopted it, but a relative majority think that adopting the euro will mean that their country will lose
control over its economic policy.
2. We will consider Croatia as a CCC since it becomes the 29th Member State of the EU from 1 July
2013. Regarding Iceland, although on 13 September 2013, the Government of Iceland suspended
its application to join the EU, it was also a CCC during the examined sample. Nevertheless, the EU
has stated that Iceland had not formally withdrawn the application.
3. This exchange rate system has been adopted by developing countries experiencing high inﬂation.
Examples are Chile, Colombia, Israel, Indonesia, Ecuador, Russia, and Venezuela.
4. As Ledesma et al. (2005a, 2005b), we also implemented the ﬂuctuation bands expansion, given the
importance within ERM II.
5. The similarity of the coefﬁcients is due to their own distribution functions. To be symmetric around
zero it is reasonable that the estimated coefﬁcients are practically equal and differ closed to the
tails. Both models are very similar with respect to the predicted probabilities (Cameron & Trivedi,
2010).
6. Due to space limitations, we do not show graphically the detection of implicit ﬂuctuation bands for
each currency analysing the three alternative procedures for ±1% and ±2%, but they can be requested
from the authors.
7. Given that under ﬁxed exchange rates the monetary authority is committed to defend its exchange rate
maintaining its central parity or ensuring that its path is within the ﬂuctuation band provokes a favour-
able context for investment and trade as a result of the reduction in the degree of uncertainty and
reduced transaction costs.
8. Due to space limitations we do not show graphically the estimated realignment probability of the
exchange rates vis-à-vis euro based on the distance from the upper ﬂuctuation band nor based on
the interest rate differential with respect to the Euro Zone, nevertheless it is possible to request
them from the authors.
9. Both the national and the Euro Zone interest rate corresponds to the 3-month interbank extracted from
Eurostat and the ECB.
10. Recall that these estimated coefﬁcients have no interpretation to which we are accustomed to work in
traditional econometrics, for this reason the calculation of the marginal effects is necessary, but as an
the objective of this paper, we are concerned about their sign to see how these variables inﬂuence the
probability of realignment.
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Appendix. Additional results
Figure A1 (Panels A–E) indicates, for each of the investigated countries, at what time the domestic interest
rate9 is outside the return bands since this is evidence of the lack of credibility in these sub-periods. Each of
these ﬁgures is explained in detail when we focus on a particular interpretation of each country making a
comparison between the three considered approaches.
The results on how the explanatory variables of the method DA inﬂuence the expected depreciation
within the band are provided in Table A1. These coefﬁcients have been estimated by OLS, correcting
their standard errors for possible heteroskedasticity or serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987)
covariance estimator. Among the main conclusions, note that the coefﬁcient associated with the logarithm
of the distance from the central parity (x) is highly signiﬁcant and inversely affects the expected depreciation
within the band, corroborating the average of exchange rate reversion hypothesis for all currencies under
study. This negative sign means that if economic agents observe at time t a deviation from its central
parity they form stabilizing expectations, that is, expect that the exchange rate is close to the central
parity in the following period stabilizing their behaviour towards equilibrium. However, in our study
there is no consensus on how it affects the proﬁtability of holding ﬁnancial assets in domestic currency
(i) and foreign currency (i*) on the expected depreciation. Starting with the domestic interest rate, the
only currency that matches with the results of Svensson (1993), Rose and Svensson (1994), and
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2000, 2005a) is the Icelandic krona reﬂecting the expected negative sign,
being signiﬁcant at 10%. Other currencies show both positive and negative signs varying with the level
of signiﬁcance.
With respect to the reference interest rate relative to the Euro Area, this variable cannot be considered as
explanatory of the expected depreciation behaviour since it does not display signiﬁcance in any country.
Finally, taking into account the high p-values that show the dichotomous variables, the limited relevance
of the different exchange rate regimes can be concluded.
Moreover, Table A2 shows the results of estimating the Logit model for the different explanatory vari-
ables explained in Section 2, in order to assess the probability of realignment. In this procedure, and given
our interest, we focus on the signs interpretation of the estimated coefﬁcients.10 As in Ledesma-Rodríguez
et al. (2005a), we ﬁnd that in most of the sample, there is enough empirical evidence to say that as a result of
depreciation of the domestic currency, an increase (decrease) in the probability of realignment (credibility)
occurs.
As in Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005a), we ﬁnd that in most of the samples, there is enough empirical
evidence to conﬁrm that a domestic currency depreciation provokes an increase (decrease) in the probability
of realignment (credibility). However and contrary to expectations, for the Turkish lira, it can be seen that a
depreciation vis-à-vis the euro would trigger a signiﬁcant increase in the credibility of the exchange rate
system. In general, with the exception of the Serbian dinar, Croatian kuna, and Icelandic krona, it shows,
with high signiﬁcance, how the fact of turning aside the central parity negatively affects the probability
of the exchange regime credibility. Another indicator that has been used in this paper as a robustness
measure is the distance with respect to the upper ﬂuctuation band.
As expected, the domestic interest rate differential with respect to the Euro Zone triggers a negative and
highly signiﬁcant impact on the probability of credibility, thereby increasing the probability of a realignment
in the exchange rate.
Due to space limitations, Table A3 provides the most important descriptive statistics (mean, median, and
standard deviation) of the estimated probability of realignment for all exchange rates analysed in this paper
according to the four explanatory variables, however anyone interested in the rest of descriptive statistics can
request them from the authors.
9Both the national and the Euro Zone interest rate corresponds to the 3-month interbank extracted from Euro-
stat and the ECB.
10Recall that these estimated coefﬁcients have no interpretation to which we are accustomed to work in tra-
ditional econometrics, for this reason the calculation of the marginal effects is necessary, but as an the objec-
tive of this paper, we are concerned about their sign to see how these variables inﬂuence the probability of
realignment.
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Figure A1. Svensson (1991)’s credibility test of the exchange rate ﬂuctuation bands vis-à-vis the euro.
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Figure A2. Expected realignment rate of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro and its conﬁdence interval at 90%.
Notes: The vertical lines correspond to realignments and bands extensions.
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Figure A3. Estimated realignment probability of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro based on its
exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro.
Notes: The vertical lines correspond to realignments and bands extensions. It is not possible to represent the
exchange rates graphically for those cases where the dependent variable always takes the same value (either
one or zero) since this procedure cannot be applied.
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Figure A4. Estimated realignment probability of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro based on the distance
from the central parity.
Notes: The vertical lines correspond to realignments and bands extensions. It is not possible to represent the
exchange rates graphically for those cases where the dependent variable always takes the same value (either
one or zero) since this procedure cannot be applied.
Table A1. Expected depreciation of the exchange rates within the band.
HRK/EUR ISK/EUR MKD/EUR RSD/EUR TRY/EUR
D1 −0.0035
(0.8439)
0.0071
(0.9641)
−0.0035
(0.5700)
0.1275
(0.2098)
−0.0898
(0.5724)
D2 −0.0213
(0.1915)
0.0495
(0.7122)
−0.0025
(0.5714)
0.0171
(0.8727)
−0.0579
(0.8004)
D3 0.1398
(0.4083)
0.0002
(0.9704)
0.1357
(0.0760)
−0.0057
(0.9427)
D4 −0.2223
(0.3939)
D5 0.0867
(0.3249)
X −2.7071
(0.0000)
−5.2159
(0.0000)
−2.3167
(0.0000)
−2.3138
(0.0000)
−2.8542
(0.0000)
i 0.5283
(0.0052)
−1.4886
(0.2540)
0.0012
(0.9047)
−0.7743
(0.0582)
0.3303
(0.0667)
i∗ −0.6588
(0.2462)
2.7714
(0.4985)
0.0679
(0.3009)
0.4702
(0.8338)
−2.6932
(0.3155)
Notes: In parentheses are the p-values. The dummy variables D1–D5 take value one between realignments and ﬂuctuation
bands enlargement, X represents the logarithm of the distance of the exchange rate with respect to the central parity and i
and i* show national and Euro Zone 3-months interbank interest rates, respectively.
36 S. Sosvilla-Rivero and M. C. Ramos-Herrera
Table A2. Estimation results of the Logit model.
HRK/EUR ISK/EUR RSD/EUR TRY/EUR
Exchange rates
d1 64.6116
(0.0003)
6.5904
(0.0000)
2.0528
(0.3674)
−1.7263
(0.0244)
d2 −8.3249
(0.0004)
−0.0296
(0.0002)
−0.0093
(0.7332)
1.9515
(0.0000)
Distance from the central parity
d1 4.8031
(0.0000)
5.0495
(0.0000)
1.2222
(0.0258)
1.5066
(0.0000)
d2 −21.4428
(0.0001)
−0.2322
(0.0001)
0.0377
(0.8979)
−0.1153
(0.9699)
Distance from upper ﬂuctuation band
d1 −1.2482
(0.0627)
3.5159
(0.0000)
−0.5363
(0.3791)
−1.4635
(0.0039)
d2 19.7021
(0.0000)
−0.0697
(0.0005)
0.5669
(0.0031)
22.7604
(0.0000)
Interest rate differential with respect the Euro Zone
d1 2.9402
(0.0000)
6.2424
(0.0000)
−0.2713
(0.6175)
4.0098
(0.0000)
d2 −0.2545
(0.0007)
−0.4456
(0.0001)
0.2289
(0.0140)
−0.0744
(0.0000)
Notes: In parentheses are the p-values. In each case we show the estimated parameters associated with each explanatory
variable (exchange rates, distance from the central parity, distance from upper ﬂuctuation band, and interest rate differential
with respect to the Euro Zone) that we consider explains the probability of realignment.
Table A3. Statistical summary of the estimated probability.
HRK/EUR ISK/EUR RSD/EUR TRY/EUR
Exchange rates
Mean 0.9022 0.9286 0.6152 0.7703
Median 0.9507 0.9813 0.6147 0.8484
Std. dev. 0.1037 0.1179 0.0036 0.2052
Distance from the central parity
Mean 0.8985 0.9286 0.5688 0.817
Median 0.9592 0.9869 0.6163 0.8172
Std. dev. 0.1365 0.2007 0.1593 0.0013
Distance from upper ﬂuctuation band
Mean 0.8704 0.9286 0.6343 0.7769
Median 0.9642 0.956 0.6314 0.9358
Std. dev. 0.1897 0.1234 0.1776 0.2751
Interest rate differential with respect the Euro Zone
Mean 0.8993 0.9286 0.6342 0.8169
Median 0.946 0.9612 0.8442 0.9507
Std. dev. 0.1075 0.1168 0.3524 0.2742
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